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Abstract 
The idea of Southern criminology poses a challenge not just to its mainstream parent, which 
is now asked to contemplate life, crime and social order outside the metropolitan North. 
Southern criminology also asks those who would work under its name to find new ways of 
thinking about phenomena so that the South is understood on its own terms. This chapter 
contemplates such challenges. It draws upon a body of postcolonial thought largely unknown 
within criminology to help think through Southern criminology’s options for escaping the 
cultural and epistemological confines of mainstream, Enlightenment thought. It illustrates 
different ways of building out from these forms of thought, which can never totally be 




The idea of Southern criminology invites us to look with fresh eyes upon the distinctly 
metropolitan character of its parent discipline. It asks us to consider the nature, dynamics and 
impacts of crime in a more global fashion and to think more expansively about how concepts 
or explanatory theories might be generated from centres of knowledge beyond the metropole. 
This chapter engages with the idea of Southern criminology by examining one of its key 
presumptions. This concerns what might be termed the ‘conditions of possibility’ for an 
alternative vision of crime and society coded to the histories, cultures and societies of the 
global South. If such a thing could be unlocked it would help build a new criminology ‘more 
inclusive of patterns of crime, justice and security outside the boundaries of the global North’ 
(Carrington, Hogg and Sozzo 2016: 15). Since the vast majority of states and societies 
making up the putative global South are also postcolonial states, this chapter will engage 
squarely with postcolonial theorising on the problems of knowledge in the periphery. It will 
proceed in two stages.  
 
Focusing upon South Asia, a region that takes in the modern-day states of Bangladesh, India 
and Pakistan (population roughly 1.7 billion), the chapter will first examine if not the 
presumption, then at least the hypothesis, seemingly embedded in the foregoing prescription. 
This is the notion that metropolitans and Southerns might each have something like a 
‘natural’ epistemological referent: for metropolitans, Western thought; for colonial subjects 
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and postcolonial citizens, some form of indigenous thought that might offer an alternative 
discourse. Clearly this is an overly stark contrast, but the first section of the chapter will 
begin to examine it with reference to colonial contexts, theories of crime and criminologies 
that emerged on the sub-continent over the roughly 150 years from 1765 to 1947, when 
Britain quit India. What this reveals is rather unexpected, for it inverts the above presumptive 
structure. What it shows is that colonial administrators, British and Indian alike, tended to 
frame their thinking about Indian crime to reflect the unique historical, cultural, religious, 
social, economic and environmental conditions from within which it emerged there. Colonial 
models of ‘native’ crime were highly localized and nuanced, albeit doubtlessly to some 
degree Orientalized in the Saidian sense (Said 1978; see also Inden 1990), but policed for 
their truth value by the utilitarian question of efficacy: administratively, did it work? It was in 
fact well-read and worldly Indian legal scholars who in the 1920s introduced metropolitan 
theories of crime to the sub-continent. In doing so they sought to advance understandings of 
crime in South Asia while at the same time offering a narrative of difference, pointing to the 
uniqueness of Indian life, conditions and culture. What this first part of the chapter will show, 
then, is that there is no easy line to be drawn between Northern and Southern thought, either 
in character or from whom or in what place it might be expected to emerge. 
 
Indian legal scholars’ adoption of Western ways of thought was not unique. These practices 
and their ideas about valid kinds of knowledge shaped much of the thinking among colonized 
native elites. One group in particular, collectively described now as anti-colonial nationalists, 
have been much discussed in postcolonial work on the nature of knowing and being in the 
colonial/postcolonial condition. The complex and conflicted relationship between anti-
colonial struggles and postcolonial searching for identity lead Partha Chatterjee (1986) 
famously to refer to Indian nationalist thought as a ‘derivative discourse’. For the Subaltern 
Studies Collective, of which Chatterjee was a key member, the task of unearthing some kind 
of genuine, almost primordial center of indigenous thought and knowledge, untainted by the 
colonial experience, was a central concern. How, after all, can one be genuinely Indian, or for 
that matter Southern, if every way of your own thinking is nothing but a reflection of Western 
modes of thought, of Western responses to the invocation ‘know thy self’? The second part of 
the chapter will engage with this literature and its debates that precede by many decades the 
aims of Southern criminology to examine the possibilities of knowing and representing life 
and experience in the postcolony.  
 
Yet why should examining these epistemological conundrums be so important? The reason is 
as simple as its implications are manifold. It goes to the heart of what Southern criminology 
is, or could potentially be. Set as a question, we might ask: is Southern criminology anything 
new or different, or is it fundamentally but one more variant of criminology’s oldest game, 
comparative or transnational observation? If it is the latter – if all it does is drive 
criminologists’ attention toward the crimes and concerns of the periphery – then it will be 
doubtlessly worthy, but ultimately unremarkable in terms of reshaping what criminology is. 
If, on the other hand, Southern criminology really is something different, then it will, indeed 
it must, fundamentally change the whole discipline itself, including the structure of 
criminology’s Enlightenment-derived thinking. Thus, if Southern criminology is to be more 
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than just another inflection of transnational criminology it must do more than simply add 
observations from the South to test or revise existing theory. It must discover in the South 
resources for thinking about crime and justice that are as yet unimagined within the discipline 
of criminology. 
 
That is doubtless a big task. It is not one, moreover, that will be achieved simply by doing: by 
turning our lens upon novel forms of crime that mark the periphery and cast a shadow upon 
the metropole or by evaluating the adequacy of metropolitan theory as it travels to the 
margins. What this chapter proposes is that scholars of Southern criminology must first 
contemplate how the South can be known on its own terms: how can it, as Raewyn Connell 
(2007) asked, be a source of theory, not merely a source of data? Answering this will require 
some focused thought. Postcolonial scholars have spent more than 40 years doing just that, 
thinking through possibilities for knowledge, ways of being and knowing that do not rely or 
constantly fall back upon Western cognitive structures. These structures are powerful modes 
of analysis, barely apprehensible to most of us, but they have in a very meaningful sense 
ruled the world since the Enlightenment.  
 
Those not familiar with such matters might here be asking ‘what kind of structures?’ or ‘such 
as what?’. One example of a structure that has for centuries been used to evaluate the truth, 
adequacy or utility of Western and non-Western knowledge alike is the notion of reason. 
Reason has for hundreds of years policed the boundary of valid and futile thought, acceptable 
or illogical beliefs, civilized or debased behavior. It has represented non-Western experience 
in terms as various yet familiar as ‘idolatry’, ‘superstition’, ‘barbarism’, the ‘excitable’ or 
‘inscrutable’ native and so on. Ever since John Locke (1690) introduced reason as a condition 
of political consent in his Second Treatise on Government – thus excluding ‘idiots’, mad men 
and children – and JS Mill (1861) extended this logic grouping children and ‘barbarians’ as 
suitable subjects of despotic governance, reason has exercised a grip over inhabitants of the 
global South (see Mehta 1999). The second part of this chapter will trace the way 
postcolonial writers and critics of anti-colonial nationalism have wrestled with such 
predicaments. It will examine their efforts to reconcile the need to speak of ‘nation’ and 
‘people’, just as we as criminologists desire to discuss ‘crime’ and ‘justice’, without settling 
back into the same forms of logic and meaning from which our anti-metropolitan struggles 
seek to give us escape. To begin though, let us turn to the case of South Asia and the 
emergence of modern thought on crime and criminals since roughly the mid eighteenth 
century.  
 
A brief history of criminology on the sub-continent 
Can one usefully speak of a colonial criminology of the sub-continent? The answer is that 
while we might identify the contours of one from the position of hindsight it is unlikely that 
many actors of the time would have understood such a thing to exist. I have attempted 
elsewhere and with the resources of far more space than is available here to propose a first, 
schematic genealogy of a pre-independence criminology (Brown 2017). It is not my aim here 
to rehearse these arguments about the birth of criminology in India, though I will of course 
refer to some main conclusions. Rather, what I hope to do is give the non-specialist reader a 
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broad introduction to thinking about crime and criminals on the sub-continent and a sense of 
the importance of colonialism and the immanent postcolonial condition to the formation of 
knowledge about those areas of the world we now group under the rather baggy term global 
South. 
 
A ‘colonial’ criminology? 
On the Indian sub-continent, the ‘onset’ of colonialism is generally dated at 1765, the year 
when the British East India Company, trading under a Royal Charter of monopoly commerce 
in the East Indies, established its first political bridgehead in Bengal. Even this apparently 
early date, however, foreshortens the depth and extent of colonial contact in India. The East 
India Company’s charter had been granted in 1600 and it had traded extensively around India 
since that time. Across such distances of time it is neigh impossible to retrieve anything like 
an original or ‘authentic’ Indian vision of crime and criminality, something that might stand 
in contrast to colonial conceptions of the same. Moreover, the sub-continent itself is 
physically immense and culturally and ethnically diverse in equal measure. Instead of such 
simple contrasts as between indigenous and metropolitan knowledge what we find over this 
sweep of time are rather a set of accretions. Ideas were piled atop of each other, some of local 
origin, others of foreign source. Forms of crime apparently distinctive to India, like the 
phenomenon or Thuggee (Wagner 2009) or the supposed existence of whole tribes of 
hereditary criminals (Brown 2014), prompted novel responses or legal innovations. New 
ideas fed off, and themselves further developed, new sciences of the human type, such as 
ethnology, while the enterprise that we may term now a kind of nascent criminology was for 
the most part always tightly bound to the demands of colonial administration and its complex 
and changing priorities. 
 
Despite today’s images of colonialism as all-encompassing, British power on the sub-
continent is better understood as an ever-shifting balance of expensive incursions into 
‘native’ culture and society counterpoised with a certain and much cheaper strategic letting 
alone. The spirit of early views on this is well covered by the first Governor General of India 
Warren Hastings commenting on a legal compendium he had recently commissioned. 
Eventually published as Halhed’s (1776) Compilation of Gentoo Laws, or Ordinations of the 
Pundits, the text was an attempt to digest into the form of a code extant Hindu jurisprudence 
derived from textual sources and interpreted by Brahmanic scholars. The task was important, 
Hastings wrote, because it concerned ‘the rights of a great nation in the most essential point 
of civil liberty, the preservation of its own laws’ (reproduced in Gleig 1841: 404). The 
compilation, he suggested, would be evidence of ‘the way to rule this people with ease and 
moderation according to their own ideas, manners and prejudices’ (Hastings in Gleig 1841: 
404).  
 
Although attitudes toward ‘native’ disorder certainly hardened across the long nineteenth 
century, it is equally true that for the most part colonial administrators took little interest in 
‘native’ crime and criminals unless they presented a threat to British authority, sparked its 
imagination or transgressed norms of the imagined new civil society. Almost 100 years later 
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in October 1870 the jurist and legal member of the Viceroy’s Council, James Fitzjames 
Stephen, gave voice to this ambivalence in the Council chamber:  
 
The Hon’ble Mr Stephen moved for leave to introduce a Bill to provide for registration 
of criminal tribes and eunuchs. He was glad to be able to say that as far as his 
experience had gone, he did not think that the Natives of India were by any means a 
peculiarly criminal people. He thought that Bombay and Calcutta might in this respect 
compare by no means disadvantageously with Liverpool and Birmingham, and he was 
informed that many parts of the Mofussil produced far less crime in proportion to their 
population than parts of England. (National Archives of India 1871) 
 
But as the purposes of the Bill would indicate, colonial government identified phenomena 
like India’s supposed criminal tribes as a matter of a whole different order. The legislation, 
eventually passed in 1871, created a large, punitive and illiberal architecture of control for 
both nomadic and sedentary communities that appeared to live by crime alone. Perhaps more 
importantly for criminology, the criminal tribes policy initiated probably the most 
thoroughgoing investigation and theorization of ‘native’ criminal ways and propensities of 
the colonial era. Further, the social and cultural imprints of the criminal tribes concept 
outlasted this era, with such groups designated under the new postcolonial Indian 
Constitution as ‘denotified tribes’ who soon became captured within an armature of social 
hygiene measures within the postcolony (Brown 2016; Schwartz 2010).  
 
Varieties of colonial criminology 
To the extent that we can discern things from the vantage point of hindsight, colonial 
criminology took two distinct forms. First, although arriving fairly late in the piece, it was the 
scale of the criminal tribes policy and the complexity of its operation that first drew disparate 
practical and conceptual developments together into something like a body of knowledge. 
The policy required the identification and classification of tribes as criminal, a whole 
complex of systems for reading and decoding the traces and patterns of criminal conduct such 
tribes left behind and an extra-penal framework of apprehension, punishment and reform for 
these groups who by 1947 numbered some three to four million souls. It achieved all of this 
through on the one hand the recruitment of supposedly archaic, indigenous systems, such as 
village level policing, and on the other the reframing of modern methods, such as extra-penal 
legal innovations developed to combat Thugs during the 1830s, or even earlier anti-dacoit 
measures of the 1770s that had first explored methods of policing and punishing whole 
communities. All of these were grafted onto and inflected through a social ethnology of 
Indian crime that was then manualized and promulgated in the form of handbooks and guides 
(for example, Kaul and Tomkins 1914; Kennedy 1908). By the second decade of the 
twentieth century, these had formed into a social ethnology of Indian crime that eschewed 
biological racism and focused instead on the unique characteristics of what were perceived as 
distinct criminal communities within Indian society. 
 
Brought together, all of this formed a body of thought and practice that would later morph 
into Indian social work approaches with criminals (for example, Harshe 1941). Mostly this 
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effort was driven through an increasing governmental concern with the status and fate of 
what in India were termed ‘backward classes’, including indigenous hill tribes and the 
country’s ‘untouchable’ castes, as well as its criminal tribes. The weight of this relief work 
was partly shared with charitable societies, of which the Salvation Army was a prominent 
actor, building not only reformatory institutions but also reformatory theories, such as 
reflected in Frederick Booth-Tucker’s (1916) Criminocurology: The Indian Crim and What 
to Do with Him. Overall, however, what marked this, the primary strain of colonial 
criminology, was its deep embeddedness in local context, culture and indigenous codes of 
conduct and practice. It was distinctly Indian in character and in no way merely a tropicalized 
version of then-contemporary metropolitan thought. This is not to say that Indian criminology 
in this practical form was entirely isolated from global thought and developments. Finger 
printing, after all, was developed in India, extending and perfecting principles of criminal 
anthropometry, such as the French ‘Bertillion method’ (Sengoopta 2003). But at a theoretical 
level, while metropolitan ideas did from time to time find reflection in the work of Indian 
proto-criminologists, whether it be Henry Spry’s (1833) work with Edinburgh phrenologists 
or the impact of a tour of English, French and Irish penal facilities upon Punjab Inspector 
General of Police Hutchinson’s (1866) Reformatory Measures Connected with the Treatment 
of Criminals in India, they were for the most part short lived.  
 
Against this vision of criminology as a practice-focused body of knowledge about Indian 
crime and criminals, we find a second much smaller but nonetheless distinctive strain that 
emerged around about 1920. This brought the big names and big ideas of metropolitan 
thought squarely into contact with the Indian climate for the first time. As Subrahamania 
Pillai’s (1924) 700-page tome Principles of Criminology might suggest, these works were of 
a different order to the administratively focused crime control texts just described. Pillai was 
the Tagore Professor of Law at Madras Law College and his opposite number in Calcutta, 
Sitram Banerjee, had published a similar volume just a few years earlier. These were 
lawyerly and cerebral treatises drawing ideas from across place and time. As one reviewer of 
Pillai’s work in the pages of the British Journal of Comparative Legislation and International 
Law remarked, the work ‘show[ed] very strongly the effect of European ideas and views 
upon the mind of a thoughtful and learned Indian lawyer’ (GGA 1925: 268). 
 
Yet as quickly as metropolitan sophistication entered these texts India itself receded into the 
background. Banerjee’s (1919: 68) enthusiastic claim that ‘nowhere else in the world do we 
find this curious admixture of heterogeneous races – with different languages, different 
religions, and at different stages of culture’ did little more than echo those of Bengal 
ethnologists more than half a century earlier (eg., Asiatic Society of Bengal 1867). His 
clunky stereotypes of native difference reflected a scholarly distance from the real India, 
should there have been such a thing, which settled once and for all the irrelevance of his work 
for practical crime control purposes. What these texts did do though, was presage an effort to 
make criminology theoretical and at the same time to make it connect with non-metropolitan 
knowledge systems. A fuller account came first in 1932 from another lawyer, in Prosanto 
Kumar Sen’s From Punishment to Prevention, and then more substantially a decade later in 
his Penology Old and New (Sen 1943). The problem was, however, that in order to 
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‘indigenise’ theoretical discussions of crime and punishment writers like Sen were forced 
back into the world of ancient (primarily Hindu) texts which admittedly held little relevance 
for day to day thinking about crime and punishment. Thus, for example, on the question of 
individual responsibility Sen could note the problem in Hindu thought of the ‘all-pervading 
law of Karma’. ‘Buddhism’, he observed, had ‘sought to break down caste. But its view-point 
in regard to Karma remained essentially Brahminical and militated against laying down a 
standard of responsibility for human action based upon the conception of absolute free will’. 
The effect was that in classical Hindu thought ‘[n]ot absolute but only relative freedom was 
attributed to human action’ (Sen 1943: 89).  
 
This recourse to a distant, ancient and in that sense pure form of Indian knowledge untainted 
by Western categories yet nevertheless able to be discussed alongside Western thought was a 
feature of these times. It reflects a certain kind of thinking and a cross-pollination of anti-
colonial impulses into various intellectual endeavors of the era. It shares much in common, 
for example, with PC Ray’s History of Hindu Chemistry which, in two volumes (1903, 1909), 
sought to reconstruct an indigenous materials science running from the pre-Buddhist era 
through to the mid sixteenth century. It was a task, moreover, as Ray wrote in the preface to 
his second volume, undertaken to recognize ‘[t]he Hindu nation with its glorious past and 
vast latent potentialities’ and to drive Indians toward ‘regaining their old position in the 
intellectual hierarchy of nations’ (1909: D). The country’s failure to keep pace with 
metropolitan thought was a problem that vexed Indian intellectuals of the time. In the first 
volume of this study PC Ray had diagnosed the problem to lie in caste, though not the 
supposed colonial ‘construction’ of revisionist postcolonial critiques (for example, Dirks 
1998). Rather, for Ray it was the ancient system of caste made rigid around the second to 
third century Before the Common Era, and reflected in the scriptures of Manu, that had 
prematurely stunted Indian capacity for progress. It had, he said, rendered ‘her soil … 
morally unfit for the birth of a Boyle, a Des Cartes [sic] or a Newton and her very name was 
all but expunged from the map of the scientific world’ (1903: 195-96). 
 
If such observations were made with sadness by a chemist, the problem of India’s 
subordination to Britain and to metropolitan thought and power was both more acute and 
more important for nationalists. It was in this field of anti-colonial struggle that we see most 
clearly an effort to find a means of escape from the seemingly overbearing, always-
everywhere presence of the Western episteme. Broadly speaking, however, as the colonial era 
came to a close the intellectual resources and body of knowledge on crime and criminals in 
India was clearly split in two. The main body and that which would come to dominate 
criminology after independence was the ethnological/social work discourse of reform. Efforts 
to theorize criminology largely fell by the wayside and the legacy of Western influence came 
to be an empiricist and strongly US-influenced vision of criminology as science. Recent 
collections on the state of Indian or South Asian criminology (for example, Shahidullah 
2017; Unnithan 2013) reflect this, treading the well-traveled tracks of their Northern 
counterpart. With the emergence of the Subaltern Studies Collective in the 1980s, however, 
attention was drawn back to this moment, when ideas of freedom and nation caused Indian 
thinkers in disciplines as various as criminology and chemistry to look back into India’s pasts 
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as a way of imagining its futures. Nationalist thought was of course at the vanguard of this 
movement, though here is not the place to retrace the history of these efforts (see, for 
example, Chatterjee 1986, 1993). Rather, what we shall turn to next is an examination of how 
postcolonial analyses of nationalism thought through the problem of imagining futures 
liberated from metropolitan domination. How this has been resolved is important, for it is the 
very same problem that Southern Criminology seeks now to confront: how to imagine the 
South other than as an object of inquiry viewed through the lenses of Northern thought and 
method. 
 
Being and knowing in the postcolony: Toward a Southern criminology 
What is India? To many readers in the second decade of the twenty-first century that question 
may seem odd, possibly even facetious. But for nineteenth century Indian intellectuals it bore 
the weight of an existential lodestone. JR Seeley, Regius Professor of Modern History at 
Cambridge University, had answered it succinctly in a series of lectures given in 1881-82, 
later published to huge acclaim as The Expansion of England (1883), that undercut Indian 
aspirations to self and nation in fundamental ways. He proposed for a start that England had 
in fact never conquered India. It could not have, because ‘India’ existed only as a product of 
the English mind and labor: prior to British rule India did not exist ‘in the political, and 
scarcely in any other, sense’ (Seeley 1883: 234), and so prior to Britain ‘there was no India’ 
(Seeley 1883: 235, original emphasis). Moreover, if India had in fact been defeated, it was 
palpably not the English who had done the job: ‘India had been conquered by an army of 
which four-fifths were natives’ (Seeley 1883: 235). Thus any English claim to ‘natural 
superiority … falls to the ground’ (Seeley 1883: 233) and indeed the conquest ‘can be 
explained without supposing the natives of India to be below other races … [or] the English 
superior’ (Seeley 1883: 238). This thing the English had called India, Seeley claimed, had 
conquered itself and that act of existential self-destruction reflected its ‘political deadness’ 
(Seeley 1883: 235), making aspirations to self-rule and nationhood little more than a fantasy. 
India lacked ‘the fundamental postulate’, he argued, ‘upon which the whole political ethics of 
the West depend. The homogeneous community does not exist there, out of which the State 
properly so called arises’ (Seeley 1883: 237). In the face of such propositions, what could it 
mean to strive to be Indian, to know one’s Indian self, other than to self-actualize a 
subordinate status already defined for you by your conqueror? 
 
Global South, Southern criminology and the lessons of nationalism 
These problems of being and knowing were passed down to societies of the global South as 
legacies of colonial pasts. Thus, while the term ‘third world’, by which most (though not all) 
of these societies were previously known, references an Enlightenment teleology of progress, 
at once hiding colonialism while situating these societies in a game of catch up with their 
former colonial rulers, the new terminology lays such relationships bare. Nour Dados and 
Raewyn Connell (2012: 13) propose that:  
 
The term Global South functions as more than a metaphor for underdevelopment. It 
references an entire history of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic 
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and social change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, 
and access to resources are maintained.  
 
Yet it is by no means clear what societies of the global South are to do to escape this ‘entire 
history’, nor how Southern criminology might play a role in that. As the complexity of 
answering the apparently simple question ‘what is India?’ would intimate, and as Raewyn 
Connell’s (2007) Southern Theory further attests, finding a voice for the South that does more 
than fill in the spaces of a pre-authorized metropolitan narrative will necessarily require 
turning some of our received thinking about what criminology is on its head. This second 
section of the chapter attempts just that and moves forward in three stages. It begins by 
setting out the terms of the problem as postcolonial scholars have understood them, focusing 
mainly on Indian nationalists’ efforts to retrieve the ideas of nation and people from the grip 
of colonial authority, just as today we seek to think of crime and justice on new terms. It then 
examines two possible sources of insight and resource as Southern criminology faces its own 
existential question: what makes you Southern? 
 
The impetus to author a narrative of Southern difference has been at the heart of both anti-
colonial and postcolonial analyses of the Indian condition. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first 
prime minister, for example, penned The Discovery of India (1946) while a political prisoner 
in a British jail. It’s imaging of a pure and progressive Indian past extends as continuous 
theme into contemporary diagnoses of the postcolonial condition such as Sunil Khilani’s 
(1997) The Idea of India. Yet how does any of this connect with the task of establishing 
Southern criminology’s alternative vision? The answer will be clearer if we listen to Partha 
Chatterjee’s (1986: 42) account of the problems facing such nationalisms, perhaps imagining 
‘Southern criminology’ where he speaks of ‘nationalist thinking’:  
 
Nationalist thinking is necessarily a struggle with an entire body of systematic 
knowledge, a struggle that is political at the same time it is intellectual. Its politics 
impels it to open up that framework of knowledge which presumes to dominate it, to 
displace that framework, to subvert its authority, to challenge its morality. 
 
Yet in its very constitution as a discourse of power, nationalist thought cannot remain 
only a negation; it is also a positive discourse which seeks to replace the structure of 
colonial power with a new order, that of national power. Can nationalist thought 
produce a discourse of order while daring to negate the very foundations of a system of 
knowledge that has conquered the world? How far can it succeed in maintaining its 
difference from a discourse that seeks to dominate it? (original emphasis) 
 
The similarities to Southern criminology’s task should be transparent. Returning to 
Chatterjee, we find him reaching a rather baleful conclusion: ‘A different discourse, yet one 
that is dominated by another: that is my hypothesis about nationalist thought’ (1986: 42). 
Indeed, if the question of how anti-colonial nationalist thought ultimately failed to make the 
leap to its own form of individuality is not clear, if its status as a derivative discourse has not 




an inherent contradictoriness in nationalist thinking because it reasons within a 
framework of knowledge whose representational structure corresponds to the very 
structure of power nationalist thought seeks to repudiate. (Chatterjee’s 1986: 38) 
 
What the experience of anti-colonial nationalism suggests, therefore, is that if the global 
South sits now at the apex of Dados and Connell’s (2012: 13) ‘entire history of colonialism, 
neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social change’, its claims to a just future and 
to recognition of its experience of violence and transgression will not be answered by 
applying the tools that first brought them to this place. Such tools are the universalisms of 
Enlightenment thought that Raewyn Connell (2007: 226) diagnosed in Southern Theory as 
producing less a universal sociology of societies than ‘an ethno-sociology of metropolitan 
society’. They are the tools that Chatterjee (1986) associates with the primacy of reason. In a 
coda titled ‘The Cunning of Reason’, he argues that as a technique and strategy of power, 
since ‘at least the middle of the eighteenth century, for two hundred years, Reason has 
travelled the world piggyback’ upon colonial and neo-imperial capitalism. The ‘marriage 
between Reason and capital’, he proposes, is the great unsolved problem of nationalisms (68) 
that have left their people exposed to global capital’s assaults.  
 
But how to think of nation or people or justice or violence without reason? As one astute 
critic observed, Chatterjee is liberal in his criticism of those who failed to overturn the 
hegemony of Western reason, but he ‘overwhelming relies on the latter’s analytical 
categories in [his] own analysis’ (Ramaswamy 1994: 961). So, then, is the putative need to 
escape the grip of metropolitan thought as a condition for a genuinely Southern form of 
criminology at best an elaborate diversion, at worst an impossible and pointless demand? The 
answer to both is no. Postcolonial writers have in recent years taken important steps forward, 
working through in both theory and practice how an alternative discourse might take shape. It 
is to these we now turn. 
 
Knowledge politics: Theory and experience North and South 
A large measure of the behemoth power of Enlightenment thought lays its claim to produce 
universal knowledge. Yet as Partha Chatterjee’s experience shows, while it is one thing to 
call out the power effects of Enlightenment rationalities such as reason, it is quite another 
effectively to escape them. A number of efforts have been made to critique the metropole and 
the scope of this literature cannot be captured here. Nor, unfortunately in the available space 
is it possible to do justice to the efforts of feminist scholars to inject a much lacking gender 
analysis (for example, Adami 2015; Visweswaran 1996). One style of postcolonial approach, 
however, developing in at least three stages, likely brings particular insights for Southern 
criminology. First, in Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference, Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000) demonstrated not just the fallacy of universalism’s 
claims but instantiated a subject-position method by which the theorist or researcher could 
skirt many of the criticisms levelled at Chatterjee. Second, Ajay Skaria (2014) extended this 
critique of universalism via a critical response to Gopal Guru’s existential question 
concerning India’s Hindu underclass, formerly known as ‘untouchables’. ‘Can the Dalit 
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articulate a universal position?’, asked Guru, addressing the capacity, and indeed even the 
desirability, of the periphery-particular appearing in the universal-general. Finally, returning 
once more to Dalit politics, Gopal Guru (2002) first in an essay and then in The Cracked 
Mirror: An Indian Debate on Experience and Theory (Guru and Sarukkai 2012) proposed an 
alternative ethics upon which to build theory and design and conduct research on the 
periphery. Since there is not space here to trace each of these in detail, I will focus on Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s illuminating contribution out of which the more recent work has developed. 
 
For Southern Criminologists, Chakrabarty’s principal contribution is not his observation that 
metropolitan knowledge is far from universal. ‘Europe’, as he noted, ‘has already been 
provincialized by history itself’ (2000: 1). Rather, what Charkrabarty does is answer the 
question of how one gets outside, so to speak, the Western episteme in order to critique it, a 
distancing that Chatterjee failed to achieve. Methodologically, Chakrabarty argues, the way 
in which metropolitan thought comes to be centered is via the device of historicism – ‘the 
idea that to understand anything it has to be seen both as a unity and in its historical 
development’ (2000: 6). Chakrabarty’s task was to work out how simultaneously to de-center 
and de-peripherize knowledge – to open up unity and universals to plurality – without also 
denigrating the gains of Western thought and its categories as, for example, Edward Said 
(1978) had so notoriously done in his book Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. 
‘It should be clear’ Chakrabarty therefore emphasized, that ‘provincializing Europe is not a 
project of rejecting or discarding European thought’:  
 
European thought is at once both indispensible and inadequate in helping us to think 
through the experiences of political modernity in non-Western nations, and 
provincializing Europe becomes the task of exploring how this thought – which is now 
everybody’s heritage and which affect us all – may be renewed from and for the 
margins. 
Chakrabarty (2000: 16) 
 
To achieve this, he attempts to straddle the two great traditions of social science, the analytic, 
which produces the universal abstract human of, for example, rights and the abstract 
researcher-subject, distanced from the object of her research, and the hermeneutic, which 
seeks understanding in the local, in place and in particular ways of being in the world. One 
tends to ‘evacuate the local’ in search of the universal, the other the opposite (Chakrabarty 
2000: 18). By such straddling, or indeed by setting lived pluralities upon concepts until now 
understood by their unity, he allows the periphery to invade the center. In the consequent 
contrasts, what is revealed is the contingency of things until now thought of as concrete and 
certain. To do this required locating and exploring non-Western engagements with some of 
the core categories of Western thought, such as rights or citizenship or civil society, that 
shape our modern world. Thus: 
 
The point is not to reject social science categories but to release into the space occupied 
by particular European histories sedimented in them other normative and theoretical 
thought enshrined in other existing life practices and archives. For it is only in this way 
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that we can create plural normative horizons specific to our existence and relevant to 
the examination of our lives and their possibilities. (Chakrabarty 2000: 20) 
 
Drawing on a deep understanding and a subtle and nuanced analysis of aspects of the culture 
within which he was raised, Chakrabarty aims ultimately to ‘write some very particular ways 
of being in the world – I call them Bengali only in a provisional manner – into some of the 
universal, abstract, and European categories of capitalist/political modernity’ (Chakrabarty 
2000: 255). In pursuing this he engages productively with that nemesis of Chatterjee that we 
have discussed previously here, the concept and practice of Western reason. ‘Where’, he 
asks, ‘would the polytheism that marks everyday life in the subcontinent find its place in such 
a frame of thought?’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 237). Ultimately, Chakrabarty’s specific 
conclusions are less important for us than the method he uses to develop his analysis. What 
this method points to is a way for Southern criminology to engage with the categories around 
which our modern world is structured without at the same time reifying existing forms of 
explanation and meaning. His work also holds lessons for the criminologist researcher, for 
Chakrabarty’s bridging of analytic and hermeneutic traditions suggests how social science’s 
‘privileging of the analytical over the lived’ (Chakrabarty 2000: 242) may be resolved. As 
Southern criminology develops, Chakrabarty’s methodology might provide a means for 
thinking about categories in a fashion that not only is plural and non-additive, in the sense 
that data are not imagined to cumulate toward some at least theoretically possible universal 
construct, but that importantly is able to integrate experiences of being in the world, 
including religious or cosmological experience and practice, in a way that does not simply 
anthropologize them. 
 
Enlightenment humanism, abjection and alternative ways of being human 
If Dipesh Chakrabarty’s assault upon the dominance of Western reason achieves its power 
through being in both tone and practice the thoughtful, subtle and precise analysis of a 
postcolonial, diaspora man of ideas, I would like to finish this second part of the chapter by 
joining his work with two exemplars that take on the same problem but respond in a quite 
different register. Of the many pithy and telling phrases Chakrabarty coins, one most noticed 
has been the following. In describing the political tradition that runs from Locke through Mill 
and into colonial discourses – the notion that ‘barbarians’, like children, have the potential 
for self-government but are not yet quite ready – Chakrabarty describes ‘Indians, Africans 
and other “rude” nations’ as consigned ‘to an imaginary waiting room of history’ 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 8). All notions that circle around the idea of a ‘third world’ or global 
South as sites of ‘development’ reflect his historicist rendering of the present into the past. 
For the Algerian anti-colonial nationalist Franz Fanon, the violence done by such thought 
needed to be called out plainly for what it was. In The Wretched of the Earth (1967), in a 
chapter charting ‘The pitfalls of national consciousness’, Fanon contrasted base racism with 
the structure of Enlightenment political reason. ‘Western bourgeois racial prejudice as 
regards the nigger and the Arab’, he wrote, ‘is a racism of contempt; it is a racism which 




Bourgeois ideology, however, which is the proclamation of an essential equality 
between men, manages to appear logical in its own eyes by inviting the sub-men to 
become human, and to take as their prototype Western humanity as incarnated in the 
Western bourgeoisie. (Fanon 1967: 131, emphasis added) 
 
Here, then, Western thought is given a quite different cast. If in the previous section the 
reader was wont to ask, as R Radhakrishnan (2003: 114) does in Theory in an Uneven World, 
‘[w]hy should derivativeness be such a hot issue to start with?’, Fanon’s words intimate an 
answer. For Radhakrishnan the answer is that for ‘the ex-colonial subject epistemological 
derivativeness would be particularly offensive and demeaning, since it was at the level of 
epistemology that colonization achieved its lasting psychic effect’ (2003: 115; see also 
Nandy 1998). But it is in Fanon’s identification of Western humanism that we find a much 
more specific target, and one that Southern criminology in particular, as a discourse of 
justice, will need to reckon with. 
 
Fanon’s work is representative of a strain of early postcolonial thinking rooted in the politics 
of African struggle. Moreover, unlike the later India-focused efforts of Chatterjee, 
Chakrabarty and other notable figures like Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhaba who have all 
sought a rapprochement with Western thought, Fanon calls for an entirely new way of being 
human. In a final chapter, he asks all the wretched of the earth to ‘shake off the heavy 
darkness in which we are plunged, and leave it behind’ (1967: 251). Having personally 
witnessed the atrocities of French colonialism in Algeria, Fanon (1967: 251) spits out an 
impassioned demand for severance: 
 
Let us waste no time in sterile litanies and nauseating mimicry. Leave this Europe 
where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them 
… in all corners of the globe. 
 
The Wretched of the Earth closes with Fanon’s demand that his ‘comrades’ should ‘turn over 
a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man’ (1967: 255). The 
capitalisation (or not) of the word ‘man’ between these two extracts is of vital importance. 
Because for Fanon and postcolonial writers and activists following in his tradition, the whole 
idea of a universal rights-bearing human, particularly as embodied in the United Nation 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), is continuous with Enlightenment 
humanism. This is the idea of universal Man reflected in the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen of 1789, that as mission civilisatrise, the ‘white man’s burden’ or an 
‘improving despotism’ had justified metropolitan imperialism and that has since proliferated 
Western theological and political norms under the guise of universal ‘human’ rights. In the 
postcolonial world, Spivak once observed, this rights regime ‘has turned out to be the 
breaking of the new nations, in the name of their breaking-in into the international 
community of nations’ (2004: 525). 
 
But how might the power of such a humanism be broached, one that even Spivak ultimately 
argues in favor of, suggesting ‘it is still disingenuous to call human rights Eurocentric’ (2004: 
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525)? In an extended study of the progress of postcolonial thought, Orientalism, Terrorism, 
Indigenism, Pavan Kumar Malreddy (2015) identifies the political gains made by the global 
indigenous peoples’ movement as evidence of the possibility not just of thinking through, but 
indeed of securing in practice, Fanon’s vaunted goal to find other ways of being human. The 
term indigenous peoples refers to those original inhabitants of settler-colonial states – the 
New Zealand Maori or Australian Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, for example – or 
indigenous tribal groups within states of extractive colonialism, such as the adivasis of India. 
In the case of tribal groups, these indigenes have been doubly colonized, as new postcolonial 
states demand their integration within state and nation. In the domain of rights, Malreddy 
draws attention to the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which 
secures indigenous groups’ collective and cultural rights – to culture itself, to cultural 
property, to recognition of attachments to land and ritual use of it, to physical resources, to 
forms of self-determination (in political spheres, in education, etc.) – that are additional to but 
do not interfere with the universal rights proclaimed and protected in the 1948 Declaration.  
 
This recognition of collective and cultural rights marks a major schism with the 
Enlightenment model of rights that sees them inhere solely in the free individual and 
obligations to flow solely out of the contracts that such individuals make (hence the notion of 
‘the social contract’). It marks a break with an epistemology grounded in ‘natural’ law and 
that at least since Thomas Hobbes (1651) has recognized no form of society prior to such 
social compacts, other than one that was, in his famous words, ‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, 
and short’ (1651/1909: 99). The 2007 Declaration does not rely upon institutional structures 
of representation – of nation or government – and establishes a realm of collective autonomy, 
marked by forms of social organization and ways of being in the world that stand outside the 
capitalist world system. It creates a kind of parallel universe inside our world, hence its 
marked controversy. In Malreddy’s estimation, it ‘continues to challenge the notion of homo 
europaeus as a universal constant, … re-author(iz)ing the “other” human that the indigene 
already is, without being overtly antithetical to Euro-humanism or the Universal Declaration’ 
(2015: 121). Here, then, we find a model that shows not just in theory but in practice how it is 
possible to displace a core discourse of metropolitan power and to recognise Southern forms 
of life, self and community. 
 
Conclusion 
As Southern criminology begins to stake claim to a position within the wider criminological 
field this chapter has identified, contemplated and offered solutions to two possible threats to 
its existence and hence visions of what it might become. The first threat is that it might in fact 
be little more than a dusting off of comparative or transnational criminology, with a shiny 
new nameplate for our era of globalization. The second is the threat that while seeking to 
transcend an elementary comparativeness, Southern criminology will fall back upon 
mainstream metropolitan epistemologies, thus reproducing, if at perhaps one step remove, the 
very forms of oppression and negation it seeks to escape. 
 
The impetus for Southern criminology flows from Raewyn Connell’s (2007) Southern Theory 
and this chapter has attempted to build upon her excavation of efforts among colonial and 
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postcolonial writers to think outside metropolitan confines, focusing here on South Asia. But 
it has also attempted to offer a description of just how criminology developed on the sub-
continent in the years of British colonial contact and rule. In other words, what specifically 
were those confines? An understanding of the state of crime thinking, of a nascent 
criminology in South Asia at the moment when Britain quit India in 1947, is thus essential to 
understanding what postcolonial criminologists had to work with. I have not reviewed the 
products of those labors here, since post-independence South Asian criminology in fact treads 
fairly squarely and uncritically within metropolitan footsteps (see, for example, Shahidullah 
2017; Unnithan 2013) and, as Connell found of the Indian women’s movement, there is ‘little 
theoretical work going on’ (2007: 174). Why this is the case is unclear, though it may reflect 
status hierarchies within the Indian academy: what Gopal Guru (2002: 5009) referred to as 
‘cultural hierarchies that tend to divide social science practice into theoretical Brahmins and 
empirical Shudras’ (lower castes). 
 
Drawing on more than 50 years of postcolonial writing, what I have attempted to do instead 
is to set out at least the contours of a solution to the key epistemological threat facing 
Southern criminology: that it will simply replicate metropolitan approaches, making it little 
more than a branch office of the metropolitan master discipline. What this would demand of 
Southern criminology is a quite new epistemological and thus methodological approach, 
though without necessarily discarding all that has come before. It is a high bar and it seems 
likely that many criminologists who would wish to identify with the idea of Southern 
criminology would have neither the interest nor inclination to rework radically what 
criminology currently looks like. For many, a Southern criminology that draws upon the 
global South to fill in gaps, reframe and regenerate existing criminological theory using 
extant methods will be sufficient. 
 
We also need to recognize that while we may talk of Southern criminology as if it had some 
essence, it can and will be different things to different people. This is no better illustrated 
than by David Ludden (2002: 4) in an historical overview of the Subaltern Studies project. 
Attempting to describe the project’s reception, he begins by citing Peter Gran’s argument that 
‘in India, Subaltern Studies is read against liberalism, Marxism, and “religious fascism”, 
whereas in the US, its “principal novelty” is its ability to represent India by being read into 
ideologies of difference and otherness’ (original emphasis). Taking further this analysis of 
how ideas will be inflected through locality and culture, Ludden continues: 
 
In the US, readers are generally encouraged to think about cultures in essentialist terms, 
in the ethnographic present; to see colonialism and nationalism as cultural phenomena; 
to disdain Marxism; and to distance academic work from partisan politics, a separation 
that bolsters academic credibility. But in South Asia, cultural change preoccupies 
scholars and activists, colonialism includes capitalist imperialism (which is still at work 
in the world of globalisation), Marxism is alive, and most scholars embrace politics in 
one form or another as a professional responsibility of citizenship. Such contextual 




Southern criminology can be no less subject to such forces than was Subaltern Studies. But if 
there is one take-away that I hope the reader of this chapter might store for future thought, it 
is the question of what it means to be Southern or postcolonial, to author a different vision of 
the world and develop a methodology for bringing that world into contact with metropolitan 
knowledge. As we saw in the first section of this chapter, as Indians thinking about crime and 
justice came into contact with the work of compatriots thinking about freedom and nation, 
they began to look back into history for some kind of counter-narrative to the dominant 
tropes of colonial criminology. While in critical terms South Asian criminology has 
languished and become theoretically moribund in the post-independence decades, 
postcolonial writers of different stripes have produced important and suggestive visions of 
what a counter-narrative to Western modernity might look like. It remains for Southern 
criminologists to pick these ideas up and begin to think through an alternative vision of 
criminology, one that takes as its central premise the need to recognize and understand other 
ways of being human. 
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